Sector Analysis

    Inside a Medical and Dental Office Feasibility Study: Provider Productivity, Payer Mix, and the SBA Deal

    By David Jones, MAI, CCIM


    Dental and physician practices are among the safest credits the SBA guarantees. On the loan-level file, dental charge-offs run 4.6 percent measured as charge-offs divided by fully resolved loans, against an all-industry average of 15.8 percent computed on the same basis across more than 1,283,073 resolved 7(a) loans (1)(2). Veterinary practices sit at 4.1 percent. Limited-service restaurants, at the other end, run 19.8 percent (1). One commercial lender's analysis of established healthcare practices puts them below 2 percent and frequently below 1 percent (3).

    That safety record has a consequence borrowers rarely anticipate. When an asset class defaults at a quarter of the program average, market demand is almost never the reason a file fails. Nobody is seriously asking whether a metropolitan county can support another dentist. What kills these deals is price, and specifically the goodwill component of price, which is where the productivity assumption from the feasibility study either holds or does not.

    That is the analytical centre of gravity for this asset class. A hotel study argues about occupancy. A self-storage study argues about saturation. A medical or dental study argues about whether one provider can produce what the seller says they produced, whether the buyer can produce it too, and whether the price being paid for that production leaves enough after debt service to survive a bad quarter. Everything else in the report supports that argument.

    There is a second, quieter reason these studies matter more than the default statistics suggest. The default rate measures loans that were made. It says nothing about the deals that were priced at a level the loan could not carry and were never written, and nothing about the buyer who paid a private-equity multiple with SBA leverage and spent seven years working for the seller's retirement. A low default rate in an asset class where the seller sets the price is partly evidence that the underwriting is doing its job.

    Why the safest asset class still needs a study

    Under SOP 50 10 8, effective 1 June 2025 with technical updates effective 1 March 2026, there is no rule requiring a feasibility study on a medical or dental transaction as such (4). The requirement is risk-based, and in practice a study is expected where the borrower is a startup, the project is ground-up construction or a substantial build-out, the transaction is a change of ownership, or the property may be classified as special purpose.

    Most practice transactions hit at least one of those. A de novo practice is a startup with no operating history. A practice acquisition is a change of ownership where the purchase price is overwhelmingly intangible. A ground-up medical office building is both a construction project and a real estate credit. The question in the field is less whether a study is required than what it has to prove.

    What it has to prove is narrower than in most sectors, and correspondingly harder. It has to establish that the production assumption in the projection is achievable by the specific provider who will be producing it, in the specific physical plant being financed, against the specific payer mix in that market. Those four elements, provider, plant, payer, and place, are the study. A report that spends thirty pages on county demographics and four paragraphs on provider productivity has inverted the analysis.

    Provider productivity as the revenue engine

    Revenue in a practice is produced by people, not by a trade area. The starting point is therefore production per provider, and the dental data is unusually good.

    The American Dental Association's Health Policy Institute puts average gross billings for a general dentist at $942,290 on 2024 data and $1,146,320 for a specialist dentist, with net income at $215,320 for general dentists and $346,520 for specialists on the 2025 release (5)(6). Those figures represent 22 percent of billings for general practice and 30 percent for specialty, and they are the anchor a dental projection is tested against.

    Underneath the headline sits the production mix. Hygiene contributes 25 to 35 percent of total production in a typical general practice, with hygienists producing $1,200 to $1,600 per day on PPO fee schedules and $2,000 or more on fee-for-service, at a production-to-wage ratio of 3 to 3.5 times (7). That ratio is one of the fastest diagnostics available on a practice's health: a hygiene department producing less than three times its wage cost is either underscheduled, underpriced, or overstaffed, and all three show up in the projection differently.

    The patient base required to sustain that production is similarly quantifiable. Roughly 800 to 1,000 active patients are needed to keep one full-time hygienist busy, and roughly 20 to 25 new patients per month per doctor is the minimum required to offset attrition and avoid a slowly shrinking practice (7). Those are the two numbers a study should test the seller's records against, because a practice with declining new-patient flow can show flat collections for two or three years while the underlying base erodes. The buyer inherits the erosion, not the flat line.

    On the medical side the equivalent data is thinner in public form. The Medical Group Management Association is the authority on physician production and compensation, and its specialty-level work RVU medians and revenue per physician full-time equivalent sit behind its subscription, so a study should cite MGMA as the source of the benchmark it uses rather than reproducing figures that are not public. What MGMA has published openly is directional and important: in its 2026 data, work RVUs fell in 16 of 23 specialties and encounters fell in all 23 (8). A projection assuming rising per-physician productivity in 2026 is arguing against the trend and needs to say why.

    The reimbursement side of the physician revenue build is public. CMS set the CY2026 Medicare Physician Fee Schedule conversion factor at $33.4009 for clinicians who are not qualifying alternative payment model participants, an increase of 3.26 percent, and $33.5675 for qualifying participants, an increase of 3.77 percent, in the final rule issued 31 October 2025 (9). That is the first meaningful positive adjustment in several cycles, and it should be modelled as such rather than extrapolated. The American Medical Association's longer view is that Medicare physician payment declined 33 percent against practice cost inflation between 2001 and 2025 (10). A single positive year does not reverse that, and a five-year projection that escalates Medicare revenue at 3 percent a year is not defensible on the historical record.

    Physical capacity is the hard ceiling

    Providers produce, but they produce inside rooms, and the room count is the constraint that cannot be scheduled around.

    In dentistry the unit is the operatory. The working benchmark is $25,000 to $30,000 of production per operatory per month, and conventional sizing runs 300 to 400 square feet per operatory, with efficiently planned offices at 330 to 350 (7)(11). Those two figures together let a study do something most practice projections omit: derive the revenue ceiling from the physical plant. A six-operatory office has a structural production limit regardless of how good the dentist is, and a projection that exceeds it is describing a building that does not exist.

    The derivation should be explicit and shown. Operatories times the benchmark production range times twelve gives a plant ceiling. The projection's stabilised revenue is then expressed as a percentage of that ceiling, and the reasonableness of the percentage is argued. A practice projected at 95 percent of plant capacity in year two is making a claim about scheduling density, hygiene utilisation, and staffing that has to be supported. A practice projected at 60 percent has an expansion argument that a lender may find attractive or may find is the reason the seller is selling.

    The same logic applies to medical exam rooms, with the complication that room requirements vary sharply by specialty and by whether the practice performs procedures. Primary care runs lean on space. Procedural and surgical suites carry mechanical, electrical, and sterilisation requirements that change both the capital cost and the room-to-provider ratio. A study should state which model applies rather than importing a generic square-footage-per-provider figure.

    From production to cash

    Production is not revenue and revenue is not cash. The gap between them is where most medical and dental projections quietly fail, and it is entirely payer-driven.

    In dentistry, the adjusted collection rate should run 96 to 99 percent, with 98 percent as a working target and anything below 90 percent a red flag that indicates either a billing problem or an uncollectable patient-responsibility balance (12). That is the easy part. The harder part is the write-down. The average PPO write-off runs approximately 25 percent, and PPO fee schedules commonly pay 30 to 50 percent below usual and customary rates (12)(13). A practice that produces $1.2 million at full fee and collects $900,000 has not underperformed. It has a payer mix.

    The underwriting implication is that production figures are meaningless without the mix behind them, and a study that presents production without the corresponding collection percentage by payer has skipped the analysis. Two practices producing identical dollars, one at 70 percent fee-for-service and one at 90 percent PPO, are different credits with different resilience, different sensitivity to a single payer's fee schedule revision, and different values.

    On the medical side the benchmarks come from MGMA and are similarly precise. A net collection ratio of 96 to 97 percent is healthy and 95 percent or below needs work. Days in accounts receivable ran a median of 47 in the 2024 Cost and Revenue Survey, with better performers at 36 (14). Accounts receivable over 90 days should sit in the 12 to 15 percent range, against a Healthcare Financial Management Association standard of below 10 percent (14). For an acquisition, those three figures on the seller's actual data are worth more than any market study, because they measure whether the revenue being purchased converts.

    The reimbursement differentials that sit underneath the mix are the most consequential numbers in this asset class and they are well established in peer-reviewed work. Zuckerman and colleagues, writing in Health Affairs in May 2025, found Medicaid physician fees at approximately 71 percent of Medicare in 2024, comprising 69 percent for office visits, 68 percent for hospital and emergency department services, and 87 percent for obstetric care, with their 27-service basket rising from 72 percent of Medicare in 2019 to 75 percent in 2024 (15). On the commercial side, Milliman puts professional reimbursement at approximately 143 percent of Medicare nationwide (16), while RAND's analysis of hospital-based care found commercial inpatient and outpatient payment at 254 percent of Medicare on 2022 data and ambulatory surgery centre payment at 171 percent (17).

    Those three figures define the entire credit spectrum in physician practice. A practice at 143 percent of Medicare on a commercial-heavy panel and a practice at 71 percent on a Medicaid-heavy panel are not the same business with different volumes. They have different revenue per encounter, different staffing economics, different sensitivity to policy, and different debt capacity. A feasibility study that does not state the payer mix and model its revenue implications is not describing the practice being financed.

    The cost structure, and the specialist paradox

    At the industry level, the 2025 cost structures for the three relevant codes read as follows, in percent of revenue (18):

    LineDentists (62121)Primary care (62111A)Specialists (62111B)
    Wages36.737.248.7
    Purchases13.412.411.0
    Rent5.83.53.2
    Marketing1.40.40.3
    Depreciation5.73.11.0
    Utilities0.60.30.2
    Profit15.512.18.0

    Three things in that table are worth a lender's attention.

    The first is the occupancy line. At 5.8 percent of revenue, dentistry carries nearly twice the occupancy burden of physician practice at 3.2 to 3.5 percent, and the reason is physical: operatories are plumbed, vacuumed, and equipped in a way exam rooms are not, which makes the space both more expensive to build and less flexible to lease. That differential is the practical threshold for testing a real estate basis. A dental deal projecting occupancy materially above the mid single digits as a share of stabilised revenue is carrying a building the practice cannot support, and a physician deal above roughly 5 percent is doing the same at a lower bar.

    The second is depreciation, at 5.7 percent for dentistry against 1.0 percent for specialists. That is the equipment intensity of the asset class made visible, and it matters for debt structuring: a dental practice has a recurring capital replacement requirement that a projection has to fund, and a lender should expect to see it as a line rather than as a footnote.

    The third is the specialist paradox, and it is the most counterintuitive finding in the data. Specialists carry a wage share 11.5 percentage points higher than primary care and a profit share 4.1 points lower. That inverts the standard assumption that specialty practice is the richer business. The visible mechanism is structural rather than economic: specialist physicians increasingly practise in larger groups where physician compensation runs through wages rather than through owner profit, so the same dollars appear on a different line. It is a reminder that industry-level profit percentages describe an accounting convention as much as a business, and that a study relying on them without understanding the entity structure behind them will draw the wrong conclusion.

    The same caution applies more sharply to a reconciliation the study will inevitably face. ADA HPI reports general dentist net income at approximately 22 percent of billings (6), while the industry cost structure shows profit at 15.5 percent (18). Those two figures are not in conflict and they must not be averaged. The gap is definitional and turns on whether the owner-dentist's own compensation sits in wages or in profit. A study should state each figure with its definition and use them for different purposes: the industry structure for line-item benchmarking of rent, supplies, marketing, and depreciation, and the ADA data for owner income.

    Scale figures complete the picture. Computed from the same data, revenue per establishment in 2025 runs $988,198 for dental practices, $1,254,361 for specialist physician practices, and $2,381,547 for primary care, with 5.8, 6.7, and 6.2 employees per establishment respectively and average wages of $62,845, $91,666, and $142,591 (18). Primary care is also the only one of the three that the industry data classifies as a growth-stage industry; dentistry and specialty practice are both mature.

    Where the source reports carry financial ratios by asset-size band, the band closest to a single-site financed practice is the one to benchmark against. For dental practices in the $1 million to $5 million total-asset band, rent runs 5.1 percent of revenue, salaries and wages 15.0 percent, compensation of officers 5.1 percent, depreciation 4.2 percent, and interest paid 0.91 percent (18). One caution: reported net income in that middle band reaches 18.7 percent for dentists, 16.7 percent for primary care, and 17.0 percent for specialists, against low single digits in the bands on either side. That sits after officer compensation, it is not owner discretionary earnings, and it should be read as an artifact of the band's tax-return composition rather than adopted as a margin.

    Goodwill, valuation, and the SBA requirement

    In most practice acquisitions the majority of the purchase price buys nothing tangible. The equipment is depreciated, the leasehold improvements belong to the landlord or to the building, and what the buyer is paying for is a patient list, a referral pattern, a schedule, and a name. That is goodwill, and it is the reason the valuation, not the market study, is the document that decides the file.

    Dental practices transact on two conventions. The collections rule of thumb puts value at 60 to 85 percent of annual collections. The earnings convention runs 5 to 8 times EBITDA for a single location, 8 to 11 times for multi-location operators above $1 million of EBITDA, and 10 to 12 times or more for platform-grade practices above $5 million, with solo owner-operator practices clearing 1.5 to 2.5 times seller discretionary earnings (19)(20). One broker reported 2024 outcomes ranging from 6.75 to 11.25 times EBITDA, reaching up to 375 percent of collections (21). These are commercial broker and advisory figures rather than agency statistics and should be attributed as such.

    The single most important adjustment in a practice valuation is the key-person discount. Where the selling owner personally produces more than 35 to 40 percent of total production, a discount of 1 to 2 turns of EBITDA applies (19), because a material share of what is being purchased walks out of the building at closing. A feasibility study on a practice acquisition should quantify the owner's personal production share as a percentage of the total, model the projection with and without that production, and state what transition arrangement bridges the gap. A study that assumes the seller's production simply transfers to the buyer has assumed away the principal risk in the transaction.

    On the SBA side the rule is specific. Where the intangible portion, meaning the amount financed less the appraised value of real estate and equipment, exceeds $250,000, or where buyer and seller are related, the lender must obtain an independent business valuation from a Qualified Source holding a CVA, ABV, ASA, or CBA credential (4). Almost every practice acquisition of meaningful size clears that threshold.

    One historical distinction is worth stating clearly, because it is a common source of confusion in the market. An older version of the standard operating procedure capped SBA-financed goodwill at 50 percent of the loan up to $250,000. The current SOP does not do that. The $250,000 figure is the trigger for an independent valuation, not a cap on the goodwill that may be financed. A borrower told otherwise is being given superseded guidance.

    The consolidation bid, and the gap an SBA buyer cannot close

    The valuation conventions above describe a market with two very different classes of buyer, and the gap between them is the most important structural fact in this asset class.

    Dental service organisations and private-equity-backed platforms buy on EBITDA multiples and are underwriting a roll-up thesis in which a practice's value includes what it contributes to an eventual platform sale. An individual dentist buying with SBA leverage is underwriting a job and a debt service schedule. The first buyer can pay 10 times EBITDA. The second cannot, because the loan has to amortise out of the same cash flow that pays the buyer's own living.

    Consolidation has moved far enough to make this a live problem rather than a theoretical one. DSO affiliation reached 16.1 percent of all dentists in 2024, up from 7.4 percent in 2015, and 27 percent among dentists fewer than ten years out of school (22). Solo practice fell to approximately 50.2 percent in 2024 from 67 percent in 2005, and practice ownership overall fell to 72.5 percent in 2023 from 84.7 percent in 2005 (22).

    The practical consequence for a feasibility study is that seller price expectations in many markets are now set by the platform bid rather than by what an individual buyer can finance. A study that simply accepts the contract price and works backward to justify it produces a projection that has to reach platform-level performance to service individual-buyer debt. The honest version tests the price against the cash flow, states the coverage at the contract price, and shows what the price would need to be to reach a comfortable coverage. That is uncomfortable to deliver and it is the reason the study is worth commissioning.

    Physician practice has travelled further down the same road. The Physicians Advocacy Institute and Avalere found 77.6 percent of physicians employed by hospitals or corporate entities as of January 2024, rising to 82.0 percent by January 2026 (23). Research published by the American Medical Association in May 2025 put physicians in private practice at 42.2 percent in 2024, down 18 percentage points from 60.1 percent in 2012, with 34.5 percent in hospital-owned practices and 6.5 percent in private-equity-owned practices (24).

    That matters for SBA lending in a way the dental figures do not. When private practice becomes a minority, the pool of buyers for an independent physician practice shrinks, and with it the exit. A lender financing a physician practice acquisition should understand that the disposition market in ten years may be a hospital system or a platform, both of which buy on their own terms, and neither of which is obliged to bid.

    Real estate, build-out, and the EPC and OC structure

    Dental build-out is expensive and the range is wide because the starting condition dominates. Construction alone runs $80 to $200 per square foot, with a former dental space at approximately $75 and a cold shell at $200 or more, rising to $300 to $500 per square foot all-in once equipment is included (25). Per-operatory equipment runs $20,000 to $40,000, with a further $8,000 to $15,000 of mechanical, electrical, and plumbing work per operatory (25)(26). A ten-operatory tenant improvement runs approximately $1.5 million all-in (25). Individual technology items are material on their own: same-day crown milling equipment runs $55,000 to $140,000 (27).

    Medical build-out adds 20 to 40 percent to base real estate cost and varies sharply between primary care fit-outs and procedural or surgical suites (28). A cost estimate that does not distinguish the two has not been done.

    Two structural points govern how the real estate is held.

    Corporate practice of medicine and dentistry doctrines in most states require the practice entity to be owned by a licensed professional. That is why these transactions routinely use an eligible passive company and operating company structure, in which a holding company owns the real estate and leases it to the operating practice. The structure is permitted and standard, and a study should describe the arrangement it is analysing rather than treating the practice and the property as a single entity.

    Owner-occupancy requirements are 51 percent of an existing building and 60 percent for new construction (4). Practices frequently lease surplus space to other providers, which is both permitted within those limits and, in a purpose-built medical office building, often the difference between a viable project and an over-built one. Where surplus space is part of the plan, the study needs to underwrite the lease-up of that space as a second, independent revenue stream with its own absorption assumption, not fold it into the practice projection as though it were certain.

    Demand analysis and the buyer pool

    Demand analysis in this asset class does less work than in others, but it is not nothing, and two of its components carry real weight.

    The first is shortage designation. HRSA reported more than 10,000 dental health professional shortage areas covering more than 59 million residents as of December 2024, rising to 63.7 million as of December 2025, with 10,744 additional dentists required to clear the designations, against a threshold approximating one dentist per 5,000 population (29). Against a national supply of 202,485 professionally active dentists, or 59.5 per 100,000 population (30), a designated shortage area is a genuine and defensible demand signal, and it is worth checking early because it also opens loan repayment and recruitment programs that affect a practice's ability to staff.

    The second is the supply count itself, done from state licensing board records rather than from commercial directories, which lag closures and list providers at addresses they left years ago. Field verification of the nearest competing practices, including whether they are accepting new patients and which plans they take, is worth more to a projection than another decimal place on a per-capita ratio.

    What cannot be sourced to a published standard, and should therefore be described qualitatively rather than dressed as a benchmark, is the trade area convention. There is no authoritative published drive-time or radius standard for a dental or medical practice, and any study quoting one as settled methodology is overstating. Patient draw is a function of specialty, payer network, referral pattern, and local road geometry, and it should be reasoned rather than asserted.

    The third demand-side variable, and the one most often missed, is the buyer pool on the other end of the hold period. The dental pipeline is expanding modestly: dental school graduates numbered 6,872 in 2024 and 7,015 in 2025, against an average dentist retirement age of 68.7 after a 41.3 year career (30). Medical schools produced 20,855 US MD graduates in the class of 2024 (31). Those graduates are the future buyers, and their willingness to own rather than be employed is the variable that determines whether the practice being financed today has an individual buyer in a decade. On the dental side ownership remains the norm at 72.5 percent. On the physician side it is now the minority position at 42.2 percent. That difference should inform how a lender thinks about exit on the two categories.

    The 2026 environment

    Four developments change how a practice projection should be written this year.

    Medicare turned positive. The CY2026 conversion factor increases of 3.26 and 3.77 percent (9) are the first meaningful positive adjustment in several cycles. Model them, and do not extrapolate them.

    Medicaid is contracting sharply. Congressional Budget Office analysis reported through KFF in July 2025 found federal Medicaid spending reduced by $911 billion over ten years, approximately 14 percent of federal Medicaid spending, with an estimated 10 million more people uninsured by 2034 (32). RAND's February 2026 modelling puts the enrolment effect at 7.6 million fewer Medicaid enrollees by 2034 (33), and Medicaid and CHIP enrolment fell by 5 million between February 2025 and March 2026 (34). For a practice with meaningful Medicaid exposure, and given that Medicaid already pays approximately 71 percent of Medicare (15), that is a compound problem: a shrinking covered population at the lowest rate in the payer stack, converting insured visits into uncompensated or forgone care. Any practice with a Medicaid share above roughly a quarter of revenue needs an explicit downside scenario, and a practice in a state that also changed eligibility rules needs that scenario at the state level.

    Operating costs are running well ahead of reimbursement. MGMA's June 2025 polling found medical practice operating costs up approximately 11.1 percent year to date, with 90 percent of groups reporting increases (35). Against a 3.26 percent Medicare increase, the margin compression is arithmetic.

    Clinical staffing is the binding operational constraint and it is priced. Dental hygienists reached a median of $94,260, or $45.32 per hour, in May 2024, up from $87,530 in 2023, an increase of approximately 7.7 percent, with the 10th percentile above $66,470 and the 90th percentile above $120,060, and 7 percent projected employment growth through 2034 (36). Dental assistants earn a median of $47,300 and medical assistants $44,200, the latter with 12 percent projected growth (37)(38). Two consequences follow for a projection. First, a hygiene department that must be paid at the 75th percentile to be staffed at all changes the production-to-wage ratio and therefore the margin. Second, a projection that holds wage growth at 3 percent for five years in a market where the last observed year ran at 7.7 percent is making a claim that needs support.

    Current SBA pricing completes the picture. With prime at 6.75 percent in August 2026, 7(a) loans above $50,000 with terms of seven years or more are capped at prime plus 2.75 percent, approximately 9.50 percent, and the SBA 504 debenture priced at 6.27 percent effective on 6 August 2026 (39)(40). On a goodwill-heavy acquisition amortising over ten years, the difference between those two costs of capital is often the difference between a coverage ratio that clears and one that does not, which is why the 7(a) and 504 split deserves analysis in the study rather than assumption.

    Dental against medical: two different risk stories

    The two halves of this asset class are frequently discussed as one and underwrite very differently.

    MeasureDentalPhysician practice
    Revenue per establishment$988,198$1,254,361 specialist, $2,381,547 primary care
    Wage share of revenue36.7 percent37.2 percent primary care, 48.7 percent specialist
    Occupancy cost5.8 percent3.2 to 3.5 percent
    Profit share15.5 percent12.1 percent primary care, 8.0 percent specialist
    Collection benchmark96 to 99 percent adjusted96 to 97 percent net collection
    Principal payer riskPPO write-down near 25 percentMedicaid at 71 percent of Medicare, commercial near 143 percent
    SBA default rate4.6 percent on a resolved-loan basisNot disclosed at code level; healthcare generally below 2 percent
    Ownership trend72.5 percent ownership, DSO affiliation 16.1 percent42.2 percent private practice, 82.0 percent employed
    Capacity constraintOperatory count and plumbingExam or procedure rooms and provider schedule

    The summary a credit officer should take from that table is that dentistry is a fee-for-service, owner-operated business whose principal risk is the write-down on the payer schedule and whose buyer pool remains intact. Physician practice is a Medicare-anchored, rapidly consolidating business whose principal risk is policy and whose independent buyer pool is shrinking. The studies should be built differently. A dental study is mostly an argument about production, payer mix, and price. A physician study has to carry all of that plus an argument about why an independent practice remains viable in a market that is moving the other way.

    What a reviewer checks first

    TestWhat a deficient study doesWhat a financeable study shows
    ProductionAccepts seller's collections as the baselineProduction per provider and per operatory, tested against the plant ceiling and against ADA or MGMA benchmarks
    Key personAssumes production transfers at closingOwner's personal production as a share of total, projection modelled with and without it, transition arrangement stated
    Payer mixReports revenue in aggregateMix by payer with collection percentage for each, and a scenario for a single payer's schedule revision
    New patientsCites total active patientsMonthly new-patient flow against the 20 to 25 per doctor threshold, with the trend over three years
    PriceWorks backward from the contractCoverage at the contract price, and the price implied by a comfortable coverage
    OccupancyIgnores itRent or ownership cost as a share of stabilised revenue, tested against the 5.8 percent dental and 3.5 percent physician benchmarks
    Medicaid exposureTreats it as ordinary revenueExplicit downside scenario reflecting the enrolment contraction and the 71 percent rate
    Wage inflationEscalates at a generic 3 percentLocal wage data by role, tested against the observed 7.7 percent hygienist increase

    Frequently asked questions

    Is a feasibility study required for an SBA loan on a dental or medical practice?

    Not as a categorical rule. SOP 50 10 8 makes the requirement risk-based and leaves it to lender judgment. In practice a study is expected where the borrower is a startup, the project involves ground-up construction or substantial build-out, the transaction is a change of ownership, or the property may be classified as special purpose. Most practice transactions meet at least one condition, and de novo development usually meets more than one.

    Why are dental and medical practices such safe SBA credits?

    On the loan-level file, dental charge-offs run 4.6 percent measured as charge-offs divided by fully resolved loans, against an all-industry average of 15.8 percent on the same basis, and one lender analysis puts established healthcare practices below 2 percent. The drivers are recurring, insurance-backed revenue, a licensed provider base that limits new entry, and demand that is largely non-discretionary. The safety record does not mean the deals underwrite themselves; it means the risk sits in price rather than in demand.

    When does the SBA require an independent business valuation?

    Where the intangible portion of the transaction, meaning the amount financed less the appraised value of real estate and equipment, exceeds $250,000, or where buyer and seller are related. The valuation must come from a Qualified Source holding a CVA, ABV, ASA, or CBA credential. Note that an older standard operating procedure capped SBA-financed goodwill at 50 percent of the loan up to $250,000; the current SOP uses $250,000 as a trigger for a valuation, not as a cap on financeable goodwill.

    What does a dental practice sell for?

    Two conventions are in use. On collections, 60 to 85 percent of annual collections. On earnings, 5 to 8 times EBITDA for a single location, 8 to 11 times for multi-location operators above $1 million of EBITDA, and 10 to 12 times or more for platform-grade practices above $5 million, with solo owner-operator practices at 1.5 to 2.5 times seller discretionary earnings. These are commercial broker and advisory figures rather than agency statistics.

    What is a key-person discount and why does it matter?

    Where the selling owner personally produces more than 35 to 40 percent of total production, a discount of 1 to 2 turns of EBITDA typically applies, because a material share of what the buyer is purchasing leaves at closing. A study should quantify the owner's production share, model the projection with and without it, and describe the transition arrangement that bridges the gap.

    How much production can a practice physically support?

    In dentistry the working benchmark is $25,000 to $30,000 of production per operatory per month, with operatories conventionally sized at 300 to 400 square feet. Multiplying operatory count by that range gives a plant ceiling, and a projection should be expressed as a percentage of that ceiling with the percentage argued rather than assumed. Medical capacity is specialty-dependent and varies sharply between primary care and procedural suites.

    How does payer mix change the credit?

    It changes both the level and the durability of cash flow. In dentistry the average PPO write-off runs near 25 percent, with schedules commonly 30 to 50 percent below usual and customary fees, so two practices producing identical dollars can collect very differently. In physician practice, Medicaid pays approximately 71 percent of Medicare while commercial professional reimbursement runs near 143 percent, so the mix determines revenue per encounter, resilience to a single payer's decision, and debt capacity.

    What has changed in 2026 that a projection needs to reflect?

    Four things. The Medicare conversion factor rose 3.26 percent for most clinicians, the first meaningful positive adjustment in several cycles. Federal Medicaid spending was cut by $911 billion over ten years with enrolment already down 5 million between February 2025 and March 2026. Practice operating costs rose approximately 11.1 percent year to date in 2025 with 90 percent of groups reporting increases. And dental hygienist wages rose approximately 7.7 percent in a single year, which makes a flat 3 percent wage escalation assumption difficult to defend.

    Sources

    1. PeerSense, SBA default rates by industry, dental and comparative industry codes. Commercial vendor analysis of SBA loan-level data. 2026.
    2. PeerSense, SBA lending report, all-industry default rate measured as charge-offs divided by fully resolved loans across more than 1,283,073 resolved 7(a) loans. 2026.
    3. Crestmont Capital, SBA loan default rates by industry, healthcare practices. Commercial vendor. 2026.
    4. US Small Business Administration, SOP 50 10 8, effective 1 June 2025, with technical updates effective 1 March 2026. Business valuation, owner-occupancy, and feasibility provisions.
    5. American Dental Association, Health Policy Institute, Survey of Dental Practice, gross billings. 2024 data.
    6. American Dental Association, Health Policy Institute, trends in dentist income. 2025 release.
    7. Practice management benchmark compilations for production per operatory, hygiene production, active patient counts, and new patient flow. Commercial and operator advisory sources.
    8. Medical Group Management Association, DataDive Provider Compensation, work RVU and encounter trends. 2026.
    9. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, CY2026 Medicare Physician Fee Schedule Final Rule, CMS-1832-F, 31 October 2025.
    10. American Medical Association, Medicare physician payment against practice cost inflation, 2001 to 2025.
    11. Dental office design and construction sizing guidance, square feet per operatory. Commercial contractor sources.
    12. American Dental Association, Health Policy Institute data on collection rates and PPO write-offs, as compiled by practice management sources.
    13. Industry compilations of PPO fee schedules against usual and customary rates.
    14. Medical Group Management Association, Cost and Revenue Survey, net collection ratio and accounts receivable benchmarks, 2024, with Healthcare Financial Management Association standards.
    15. Zuckerman and colleagues, Medicaid physician fees compared with Medicare, Health Affairs, May 2025, doi 10.1377/hlthaff.2024.01530.
    16. Milliman, commercial reimbursement benchmarking against Medicare fee-for-service rates.
    17. RAND Corporation, hospital and ambulatory surgery centre commercial prices relative to Medicare, 2022 data.
    18. IBISWorld, Dentists in the US (62121), Primary Care Doctors in the US (62111A), and Specialist Doctors in the US (62111B), industry data, key ratios, cost structure, and asset-size financial ratio tabs, 2025 estimates. Retrieved 17 August 2026.
    19. Dental practice valuation multiples by size, commercial transaction advisory. 2026.
    20. Dental practice valuation conventions, collections and earnings bases. Commercial brokerage sources. 2026.
    21. Large Practice Sales, reported 2024 transaction outcomes, as cited in commercial advisory analysis.
    22. American Dental Association, Health Policy Institute, practice ownership trends and dental service organisation affiliation, 2024 data.
    23. Physicians Advocacy Institute and Avalere Health, physician employment trends, January 2024 and January 2026.
    24. Carol K. Kane, American Medical Association, Policy Research Perspectives, physician practice arrangements, 29 May 2025.
    25. Dental office build-out cost per square foot and per-operatory equipment estimates. Commercial contractor sources. 2026.
    26. Mechanical, electrical and plumbing cost per operatory. Commercial contractor sources.
    27. Same-day crown milling equipment pricing. Commercial vendor sources. 2026.
    28. Medical office build-out premium over base real estate cost. Commercial advisory sources. 2025.
    29. Health Resources and Services Administration, dental health professional shortage area designations, December 2024 and December 2025.
    30. American Dental Association, Health Policy Institute, US dentist workforce, graduate counts and retirement age, 2024 and 2025 data.
    31. Association of American Medical Colleges, US MD graduates, class of 2024.
    32. Congressional Budget Office analysis as reported by KFF, federal Medicaid spending reductions and coverage effects, July 2025.
    33. RAND Corporation, projected Medicaid enrolment effects, February 2026.
    34. KFF Medicaid and CHIP enrolment data, February 2025 to March 2026.
    35. Medical Group Management Association, MGMA Stat poll on practice operating costs, June 2025.
    36. US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Employment and Wage Statistics and Occupational Outlook Handbook, dental hygienists, May 2024.
    37. US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Outlook Handbook, dental assistants, May 2024.
    38. US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Outlook Handbook, medical assistants, May 2024.
    39. Wall Street Journal prime rate and SBA 7(a) maximum interest rate structure, August 2026.
    40. SBA 504 debenture pricing, effective 6 August 2026.

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