Sector Analysis

    Inside a Restaurant and QSR Feasibility Study: Covers, Check Average, Prime Cost, and the SBA Deal

    By David Jones, MAI, CCIM


    Two claims dominate how restaurants are discussed in lending, and both are wrong.

    The first is that most restaurants fail in the first year. They do not. The peer-reviewed work that examined this directly found cumulative failure among independent restaurants never exceeded 60 percent over the three years studied, running at roughly 26 percent in year one, 19 percent in year two, and 14 percent in year three (1). Federal establishment data for the sector shows approximately 80 percent one-year survival, with roughly 48 to 52 percent still operating at five years and around 35 percent at ten (2). First-year failure is meaningful but it is not catastrophic, and the real attrition happens in years five through ten, which is precisely the window in which a ten-year SBA note amortises.

    The 90 percent figure that circulates has a traceable and unflattering origin. It entered general circulation through a 2003 network television programme and an accompanying American Express advertising campaign, and when the researchers who investigated the claim asked American Express for the supporting data, the company stated in writing that it could not provide any (1). It is marketing that outlived its campaign.

    The second wrong claim is more consequential for underwriting, because lenders act on it. It is that a franchised quick-service restaurant is the conservative bet and an independent full-service restaurant is the speculative one. The loan-level data says close to the opposite. On the SBA file, full-service restaurants charge off at 4.4 percent measured as charge-offs divided by fully resolved loans, comfortably below the 15.8 percent all-industry average computed on the same basis, while limited-service restaurants run at 23.3 percent on a matured cohort (3)(4). The sector aggregate of 18.9 percent across 121,027 loans, at an average loan size of $304,000 (3), describes neither half and misleads about both.

    That inversion is the single most useful fact a restaurant feasibility study can put in front of a credit committee, and everything else in this article follows from taking it seriously.

    What actually triggers a study on a restaurant deal

    Under SOP 50 10 8, effective 1 June 2025, there is no rule requiring a feasibility study because a business serves food (5). The requirement is risk-based and delegated to lender judgment. In practice a study is expected where the borrower is a startup with less than two years of operating history, the transaction is a complete change of ownership, the project is ground-up construction or a major expansion, or the property is classified as special purpose.

    The special-purpose question deserves attention because it is frequently misunderstood in both directions. A conventional restaurant occupying a general commercial building is not automatically a special-purpose property. A purpose-built, heavily branded structure with a drive-through, a fixed kitchen configuration, and a façade designed around one concept can be treated as one, and the classification is made case by case by the lender and the appraiser rather than by a list.

    Where it applies the consequence is expensive. The 504 equity injection rises from 10 percent standard to 15 percent where the property is special use or the borrower is a startup, and to 20 percent where both conditions apply (5). On a $2.5 million ground-up quick-service project with a startup borrower, that is $250,000 of additional equity turning on a characterisation the borrower does not control. A study should raise the exposure at the outset rather than let it emerge at commitment.

    Two further provisions govern most restaurant transactions. Owner-occupancy requirements are 51 percent of an existing building and 60 percent for new construction (5). And where the intangible portion of an acquisition, meaning the amount financed less the appraised value of real estate and equipment, exceeds $250,000, or where buyer and seller are related, an independent business valuation from a Qualified Source is required (5). For franchise transactions, the SBA Franchise Directory was reinstated for loans approved on or after 1 June 2025, with a one-time franchisor certification replacing the former per-loan addendum (5).

    The four-driver revenue build

    Restaurant revenue is not a market-share calculation. It is four variables multiplied together, and a projection that does not show all four separately cannot be tested.

    DriverWhat it means
    CoversThe count of guests served, derived from capacity rather than assumed. Section below.
    Check averageRevenue per cover, which varies by daypart and by service model far more than operators expect. A concept with a $14 lunch check and a $31 dinner check does not have a $22.50 average; it has a daypart mix problem or opportunity depending on which side of the door the traffic comes from.
    Daypart mixThe distribution of covers across breakfast, lunch, dinner, and late night, which determines both the blended check and the labour schedule. Two restaurants with identical daily covers and identical blended checks can have entirely different labour costs if one concentrates its volume in two peaks and the other spreads it across four dayparts.
    Off-premise shareTakeaway, drive-through, and third-party delivery, which carry different margin structures from dine-in and have become large enough that omitting them misstates both revenue and cost. This is where the delivery commission problem discussed below enters the model.

    The build multiplies through: covers by daypart, times check average by daypart, times operating days, gives dine-in revenue, with off-premise layered separately at its own check and its own commission drag. A projection presented as a single annual revenue figure with a growth rate applied to it has not been built. It has been asserted.

    Deriving capacity rather than assuming it

    The discipline that separates a defensible restaurant projection from an optimistic one is deriving covers from the physical plant instead of reasoning backward from a revenue target.

    The derivation is arithmetic. Seats, times turns per daypart, times dayparts, times operating days per year, gives an annual cover ceiling at full utilisation. The projection's covers are then expressed as a percentage of that ceiling and the percentage is argued.

    Every term in that chain has to be defended rather than borrowed. Seat count comes from the approved plan, not the concept deck. Turns depend on service model, menu execution time, and reservation policy, and vary enough between a counter-service fast-casual and a white-tablecloth dinner house that no single benchmark is portable between them. Operating days must reflect the actual schedule including closures. And the utilisation percentage is where the honesty lives: a projection at 85 percent of a plant's theoretical cover ceiling in year two is making a claim about consistent full-house trading that almost no restaurant achieves outside of a handful of peak services.

    For drive-through concepts a second derivation runs in parallel, based on traffic. Directional average annual daily traffic on the going-home side of the road, times a capture rate, gives a demand estimate that is independent of the seat count and can be triangulated against it. Capture rates require adjustment for corner position, signalisation, median treatment, and visibility. Where the two derivations disagree materially, the study has found something and should say so rather than averaging.

    Prime cost and the ceiling

    Prime cost, the sum of cost of goods and labour, is the number that decides whether a restaurant survives. At the industry level for 2025 it computes to 56.0 percent of revenue for chain full-service restaurants and 55.0 percent for single-location full-service restaurants (6), both comfortably inside the working ceiling of roughly 60 percent for limited-service and 65 percent for full-service.

    The full cost structures, in percent of revenue, read as follows (6):

    LineChain restaurants (72211A)Single-location full-service (72211B)
    Wages33.532.1
    Purchases22.522.9
    Rent8.78.9
    Marketing2.52.6
    Utilities2.62.6
    Depreciation1.41.3
    Other costs24.325.0
    Profit4.54.6

    Labour is where the survivors separate from the failures, and the separation is measurable. Analysis of full-service operator data found profitable operators holding labour at 34.2 percent of sales against 42.9 percent for the unprofitable, a gap of 8.7 percentage points (7). That is not a rounding difference. It is the entire margin twice over, given that the industry profit line sits at 4.5 percent.

    The independent corroboration for the limited-service side, absent an industry cost structure for that segment, comes from public filings. Chipotle reported food, beverage, and packaging at 30.2 percent of revenue and labour at 25.5 percent in its fourth quarter and full year 2025 results, against 30.0 and 25.2 percent in the third quarter (8). That is a prime cost near 56 percent at a very large, very efficient fast-casual operator, which tells a useful story: the ceiling is not softer in limited-service. It is the same ceiling reached by a different route, with lower labour and higher food cost.

    The condition of the industry gives that ceiling its urgency. The National Restaurant Association's 2026 State of the Industry report, published 12 February 2026, puts industry sales at $1.55 trillion across 15.8 million jobs, and reports that 42 percent of operators were unprofitable in 2025, up from 29 percent in 2024 (9). When four operators in ten are losing money, a projection showing comfortable margins has to explain what this operator does differently.

    Occupancy, and where a deal stops working

    At 8.7 and 8.9 percent of revenue (6), restaurant occupancy cost is the highest of any asset class an SBA lender routinely finances. The working threshold is that a deal begins to struggle above roughly 9 to 10 percent of stabilised revenue, and the reason is visible in the cost structure: with prime cost consuming 55 to 56 percent and other operating costs another 24 to 25 percent, there is nothing left to absorb an above-market rent.

    That threshold makes occupancy the fastest screen available on a restaurant deal, and it runs in a useful direction. Because the ratio is fixed by the economics rather than by the market, it can be inverted to produce a required revenue: divide the annual occupancy cost, whether rent or the ownership equivalent including debt service on the real estate portion, by the target percentage. A location costing $180,000 a year in occupancy needs roughly $2 million of revenue to sit at 9 percent. If the derived cover ceiling from the section above cannot produce $2 million, the site is wrong for the concept regardless of how good the trade area looks.

    That single calculation resolves more restaurant deals than any other analysis in the study, and it can be done in the first hour.

    Chain against independent: what the cost structures actually show

    Here the data delivers a finding that runs against the entire premise of franchised restaurant lending.

    Chain full-service restaurants and single-location full-service restaurants differ by 1.4 percentage points on wages, 0.4 points on purchases, 0.2 points on rent, and 0.1 points on profit (6). Those differences are noise. Two industries, one consisting of branded multi-unit operators with centralised purchasing, standardised labour models, and national marketing, the other consisting of independent owner-operators, produce essentially identical cost structures.

    Whatever chain affiliation buys, it is not operating leverage.

    The scale figures reinforce it rather than resolving it. Revenue per establishment computes to $1,469,905 for chain restaurants and $1,575,490 for single-location full-service, with 16.7 and 17.1 employees per establishment and average wages of $29,445 and $29,584 (6). The independents are marginally larger by revenue and marginally more labour-intensive. On no operating metric does the chain show a structural advantage.

    This matters because franchise fees, royalties, and advertising contributions are real costs that the franchisee pays and the independent does not, typically running 5 to 8 percent of revenue combined. If the cost structures are identical after those payments, the franchisee is generating the equivalent margin while carrying an additional burden, which means the franchise is producing something. The candidates are higher revenue per unit, faster ramp, lower variance, or better survival. A feasibility study on a franchise deal should identify which of those the specific brand delivers, using the Item 19 financial performance representation, rather than assuming a margin advantage the industry data does not support.

    The franchise question, and what the loan data says

    The evidence on whether franchising reduces credit risk is genuinely conflicting, and a study should present the conflict rather than resolve it by selection.

    The Federal Trade Commission's Issue Spotlight on franchising, published 12 July 2024, analysed SBA loan data and found franchise loans defaulting at 3.9 percent against 3.5 percent for non-franchise borrowers, with brand-level outliers including Dickey's Barbecue Pit at 20 percent (10). That is franchises performing marginally worse.

    Two large peer-reviewed studies point the same way. Patel and Pearce, working with 428,233 SBA 7(a) loans, found franchisee loans carried a higher default likelihood (11). Legendre, Nitani and Riding found franchisees just as likely or more likely to default (12).

    Against that, the restaurant-specific closure literature finds independents carrying a 59 percent higher closure hazard than chains, with mean survival of 68 months against 108 months (13).

    Those findings are reconcilable, and the reconciliation is the analytically useful part. Loan default and business closure are different events measured on different populations with different denominators. A chain restaurant can operate longer and still default, because it carries more debt against a larger build-out. An independent can close without defaulting, because the owner sold the equipment and repaid. A study that cites the closure literature to argue franchise credit quality, or cites the FTC to argue independents are safer operators, has confused the two.

    What can be said cleanly is this: the claim that franchising is inherently a lower credit risk is not supported by the SBA loan data, and a lender pricing a franchise deal more favourably on that basis is pricing a belief rather than a record. Brand-level performance varies enormously, and brand-level performance is the thing to underwrite.

    Sizing to a coverage test

    The arithmetic of restaurant debt service is where the industry-level margin figures become dangerous, and a feasibility study should walk it explicitly.

    Consider an illustration. A restaurant generating $1.5 million of revenue at the industry profit line of 4.5 percent produces approximately $67,500 of earnings before interest and tax. A $1 million SBA 7(a) loan at the current maximum rate for loans above $50,000 with terms of seven years or more, prime plus 2.75 percent, or approximately 9.50 percent against a prime rate of 6.75 percent (14), amortising over ten years, carries a monthly payment near $12,939 and annual debt service near $155,300. A 1.15 times coverage test requires roughly $178,600 of cash flow available for debt service.

    Against $67,500 of industry-margin profit, that deal fails by a factor of more than two and a half.

    It does not follow that the deal is unfinanceable. It follows that restaurant deals are not underwritten on industry margin. They are underwritten on seller discretionary earnings, which adds back the owner's compensation, the owner's benefits, and non-recurring items, and in an owner-operated restaurant that add-back is frequently larger than the reported profit. The illustration above requires roughly $111,000 of legitimate add-back to clear, which is a plausible owner salary and benefits package and an entirely testable proposition.

    The point for the study is that the add-back has to be itemised, defended line by line, and tested against whether the buyer will actually work in the business. A deal that clears coverage only because the owner's $110,000 salary was added back, and where the buyer intends to hire a general manager at $85,000, does not clear coverage. That substitution is the most common way a restaurant projection passes on paper and fails in operation, and it is invisible unless the study looks for it.

    What the loan tape shows about restaurant survival

    Returning to the finding from the opening, because it deserves the full treatment.

    On the SBA loan-level file analysed by a commercial vendor, and measured consistently as charge-offs divided by fully resolved loans on a count-weighted basis, the numbers are (3)(4):

    CategoryCharge-off rate
    All industries15.8 percent
    Full-service restaurants (722511)4.4 percent
    Limited-service restaurants (722211)23.3 percent
    Food services and drinking places, aggregate (722)18.9 percent

    Three implications follow.

    The first is methodological. The denominator matters enormously, and any restaurant default figure quoted without one is unusable. Charge-offs over resolved loans produces materially higher percentages than charge-offs over all originations, which includes active loans that have not yet had the opportunity to fail, and both differ from dollar-weighted measures. A study should state the basis every time it quotes a rate.

    The second is that sector-level analysis is actively misleading here. The 18.9 percent aggregate sits between two sub-industries that are five times apart. Any lender using a sector figure to price a specific restaurant deal is using a number that describes no restaurant.

    The third is the substantive inversion. Full-service restaurants outperform the SBA average by a wide margin while limited-service underperforms it badly. The likely mechanisms are worth naming even though the data does not prove them: limited-service loans are smaller, at an average $304,000 across the sector (3), and smaller SBA loans default at higher rates generally; limited-service concepts are more capital-intensive per dollar of revenue when a drive-through and a purpose-built pad are involved; and franchise fees and royalties consume 5 to 8 points of revenue in a segment whose margins have no room for them. A feasibility study on a limited-service deal should engage this directly rather than lean on the folk belief that a recognised brand is the safer credit.

    Cost to build and cost to acquire

    Build cost varies by format across a wide band. Contractor estimates put fast food and small-format construction at $100 to $650 per square foot, casual dining at $200 to $850, and fine dining at $300 to $1,000 (15). For ground-up quick-service specifically, hard costs run $535 to $850 or more per square foot with total project costs of $1.3 million to $2.5 million for an 1,800 square foot unit (16).

    The width of those bands is not vagueness. It reflects the starting condition, which dominates everything else. A second-generation restaurant space with usable hood, grease interceptor, and utility service sits at the bottom of the range. A cold shell requiring a full kitchen infrastructure sits at the top, and the difference between them on a 4,000 square foot space can exceed $1 million. A cost build-up that does not identify the starting condition explicitly has not been done.

    Acquisition pricing runs on a different logic and the transaction data is unambiguous about scale. Across 8,692 restaurant sales from 2021 to 2025, the median sale price was $220,000 on median revenue of $718,271 and median seller discretionary earnings of $120,355, at average multiples of 2.15 times SDE and 0.39 times revenue (17). More recently the median sale price fell to $205,000 in the second quarter of 2026, down 12 percent year over year (17).

    That median tells a story worth stating plainly in any study comparing acquisition to construction. The typical restaurant transaction in this country is a $220,000 purchase of a business generating $718,000 of revenue. Against ground-up quick-service project costs of $1.3 million to $2.5 million, the acquisition route buys existing cash flow at a fraction of the cost of creating it, and the premium a borrower pays to build rather than buy has to be justified by something specific: a market with no available inventory, a brand requirement, or a site advantage that cannot be acquired.

    Franchise development sits at the expensive end. Item 7 initial investment ranges in the 2025 disclosure documents run $1,471,000 to $2,728,000 for McDonald's, $426,735 to $2,339,525 for Chick-fil-A, $259,400 to $912,100 for Wingstop, $181,903 to $1,413,592 for Jersey Mike's, and $116,000 to $263,000 for Subway (18). The spread across brands is more than twenty to one, which makes brand selection a capital-structure decision as much as a concept decision.

    The 2026 operating environment

    Four current conditions change how a restaurant projection should be written this year.

    Food cost is still rising faster than headline inflation in the away-from-home channel. Consumer price data released 12 August 2026 shows food away from home up 3.4 percent year over year against 3.0 percent for all food (19). A projection holding food cost percentage flat while escalating menu prices at the same 3.4 percent is assuming perfect pass-through, which the 42 percent unprofitable figure suggests is not happening industry-wide.

    Wage floors are moving in the largest market. California's AB 1228 has set a $20.00 per hour minimum for fast-food employees at chains with 60 or more US locations since 1 April 2024, and the statewide minimum rose to $16.90 on 1 January 2026 (20). For a California limited-service projection those are not sensitivity assumptions. They are inputs.

    Third-party delivery economics remain punishing. Published merchant pricing runs 15 percent on the basic tier, 25 percent on the middle tier, and 30 percent on the premium tier, with pickup orders at a flat 6 percent (21). Effective all-in cost reaches 30 to 40 percent once payment processing, in-app marketing, and refunds are counted (21). Against a profit line of 4.5 percent of revenue (6), a 25 percent commission on the delivery channel does not compress the margin on those orders. It eliminates it and then some. A projection that models delivery revenue at the same contribution as dine-in revenue is wrong by the entire commission, and a study should show the channel separately with its own margin.

    Capital costs sit at a level that constrains structure. With prime at 6.75 percent, 7(a) loans above $50,000 with terms of seven years or more are capped at prime plus 2.75 percent, approximately 9.50 percent, while the SBA 504 debenture priced at 6.27 percent effective 6 August 2026 (14)(22). On a project with a real estate component, the difference between those two costs of capital across a 25-year 504 amortisation and a 10-year 7(a) amortisation is frequently the difference between clearing coverage and not. The financing structure belongs in the study rather than being left to the loan officer.

    The reject triggers

    TestWhat a deficient study doesWhat a financeable study shows
    CoversStates a daily cover countDerives covers from seats, turns, dayparts and operating days, then argues the utilisation percentage
    Check averageUses one blended figureCheck by daypart, with the mix that produces the blend
    Prime costReports it at stabilisation onlyPrime cost by year with the labour and food components separated, tested against the 60 to 65 percent ceiling
    OccupancyReports rent in dollarsOccupancy as a percentage of stabilised revenue, with the required revenue at the target percentage computed
    Off-premiseFolds delivery into total revenueDelivery modelled as a separate channel net of commission at its actual tier
    Debt serviceUses reported profitSeller discretionary earnings itemised line by line, with the owner-labour substitution tested
    Default contextQuotes a sector rateStates the sub-industry rate and its denominator, and distinguishes full-service from limited-service
    FranchiseAssumes brand reduces riskUses the brand's Item 19 and states what the franchise actually delivers
    Build costQuotes a per-square-foot rangeIdentifies the starting condition, second-generation or cold shell, and prices from it

    Frequently asked questions

    Is a feasibility study required for an SBA restaurant loan?

    Not because the business serves food. Under SOP 50 10 8 the requirement is risk-based and delegated to lender judgment. In practice a study is expected where the borrower is a startup with less than two years of history, the transaction is a complete change of ownership, the project is ground-up construction or a major expansion, or the property may be classified as special purpose. Many restaurant transactions meet more than one of those conditions.

    Do most restaurants really fail in the first year?

    No. Peer-reviewed research found cumulative independent restaurant failure never exceeded 60 percent over three years, at roughly 26 percent in year one, 19 percent in year two, and 14 percent in year three, and federal establishment data shows approximately 80 percent one-year survival for the sector. The 90 percent claim traces to a 2003 television programme and an American Express advertisement, and American Express stated in writing that it could not supply supporting data.

    Are franchised restaurants safer credits than independents?

    The SBA loan data does not support that. The Federal Trade Commission's 2024 analysis found franchise loans defaulting at 3.9 percent against 3.5 percent for non-franchise borrowers, and two large peer-reviewed studies found franchisee loans carried equal or higher default likelihood. Separate research does find independents close more often, but closure and default are different events on different populations. Brand-level performance varies enormously and is the thing to underwrite.

    What is prime cost and what is the ceiling?

    Prime cost is cost of goods plus labour. At industry level it computes to 56.0 percent of revenue for chain full-service restaurants and 55.0 percent for single-location full-service, against a working ceiling of roughly 60 percent for limited-service and 65 percent for full-service. Analysis of operator data found profitable full-service operators holding labour at 34.2 percent of sales against 42.9 percent for the unprofitable.

    How much rent can a restaurant carry?

    Industry occupancy cost runs 8.7 to 8.9 percent of revenue, and deals begin to struggle above roughly 9 to 10 percent of stabilised revenue. The ratio inverts into a fast screen: divide annual occupancy cost by the target percentage to get the revenue the site must produce. If the derived cover ceiling cannot produce it, the site is wrong for the concept.

    Why do full-service and limited-service restaurants default so differently?

    On the SBA file, measured as charge-offs divided by fully resolved loans, full-service restaurants run at 4.4 percent against an all-industry average of 15.8 percent, while limited-service runs at 23.3 percent on a matured cohort. Likely contributors include smaller average loan sizes in limited-service, higher capital intensity per dollar of revenue where a drive-through and purpose-built pad are involved, and franchise fees and royalties consuming 5 to 8 points of revenue in a segment with no margin room.

    What does a restaurant sell for?

    Across 8,692 sales from 2021 to 2025 the median sale price was $220,000 on median revenue of $718,271 and median seller discretionary earnings of $120,355, at average multiples of 2.15 times SDE and 0.39 times revenue. The median fell to $205,000 in the second quarter of 2026, down 12 percent year over year.

    How should a projection handle third-party delivery?

    As a separate channel with its own margin. Published merchant commissions run 15, 25, and 30 percent by tier with pickup at 6 percent, and effective all-in cost reaches 30 to 40 percent once processing, marketing and refunds are counted. Against a 4.5 percent industry profit line, modelling delivery revenue at the same contribution as dine-in overstates profit by the full commission.

    Sources

    1. Parsa, Self, Njite and King, Why restaurants fail, Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly 46(3), 2005, doi 10.1177/0010880405275598.
    2. US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Business Employment Dynamics, establishment survival by age, NAICS 72 accommodation and food services. Note that this series combines accommodation with food services.
    3. PeerSense, SBA lending by industry, food services and drinking places and constituent codes. Commercial vendor analysis of SBA loan-level data. 2026.
    4. PeerSense, SBA lending report, all-industry default rate measured as charge-offs divided by fully resolved loans. 2026.
    5. US Small Business Administration, SOP 50 10 8, effective 1 June 2025. Special-purpose property, equity injection, owner-occupancy, business valuation, and Franchise Directory provisions.
    6. IBISWorld, Chain Restaurants in the US (72211A) and Single Location Full-Service Restaurants in the US (72211B), industry data, key ratios and cost structure tabs, 2025 estimates. Retrieved 17 August 2026.
    7. Toast, restaurant operator performance dataset, labour cost among profitable and unprofitable full-service operators. 2025.
    8. Chipotle Mexican Grill, fourth quarter and full year 2025 results, 3 February 2026, and third quarter 2025 results, 29 October 2025.
    9. National Restaurant Association, 2026 State of the Industry Report, 12 February 2026.
    10. Federal Trade Commission, Issue Spotlight: Risks to Small Business Success in Franchising, 12 July 2024.
    11. Patel and Pearce, Franchisees and loan default on third-party guarantee loans, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 44(5), September 2020.
    12. Legendre, Nitani and Riding, Are franchises really more viable? Evidence from loan defaults, Journal of Business Research volume 133, 2021.
    13. Parsa, Self, Sydnor-Busso and Yoon, Why restaurants fail, part two, Journal of Foodservice Business Research 14(4), 2011.
    14. Wall Street Journal prime rate and SBA 7(a) maximum interest rate structure, August 2026.
    15. EB3 Construction, restaurant build-out cost per square foot by format, September 2025.
    16. Terrapin CG, quick-service restaurant ground-up construction cost, March 2026.
    17. BizBuySell, restaurant valuation multiples and financial benchmarks, 2021 to 2025 transaction data, and Insight Report, second quarter 2026.
    18. Franchise disclosure documents, Item 7 estimated initial investment, 2025 issues: McDonald's, Chick-fil-A, Wingstop, Jersey Mike's, Subway.
    19. US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index, food away from home and all food indices, released 12 August 2026.
    20. California Assembly Bill 1228 fast-food minimum wage, effective 1 April 2024, and California Department of Industrial Relations statewide minimum wage effective 1 January 2026.
    21. DoorDash published merchant pricing tiers, and industry analysis of effective all-in delivery cost. 2026.
    22. SBA 504 debenture pricing, effective 6 August 2026.

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