Sector Analysis
By David Jones, MAI, CCIM
Almost every childcare projection that fails lender review fails in the same place, and it is not the market study. It is the line where the analyst multiplied licensed capacity by tuition.
A state licence is a permission, not a forecast. It states the maximum number of children a facility may hold if every classroom is staffed to ratio, every age band fills in the proportion the licence assumes, and no child ever leaves. No operating centre meets those conditions simultaneously. Operator advisory benchmarks put a financially healthy centre at 85 to 95 percent of capacity, with anything below 75 percent in trouble, and set the floor for viability at roughly 70 percent of licensed capacity (7)(8). The Center for American Progress, working the same problem from the supply side, warns directly that using authorised total capacity as a proxy for available slots likely overestimates actual care availability, because age-mix constraints and workforce shortages prevent facilities from operating at their paper maximum (9). The defensible underwriting assumption for a mature, well-run centre is 80 to 90 percent of licence. Modelling to 100 percent is not optimism. It is a category error about what the document says.
That distinction matters more in childcare than in most asset classes, because the sector's revenue is hard-capped in a way that retail, hospitality, and professional services revenue is not. A restaurant with strong demand adds covers. A dental practice with a full schedule extends hours. A childcare centre that fills its infant room cannot enrol a thirteenth infant into a room licensed for twelve, no matter how long the waitlist is, because the constraint is a regulation enforced by inspection. Growth requires either a new classroom, a licence amendment, or a second location. Each is a capital event.
The second failure point follows from the first. Because ratios must be staffed before tuition arrives, the labour cost of a new classroom lands in full on the day it opens and the revenue arrives over the following year. That inverts the ramp economics most lenders are used to seeing, and it is why the funding requirement in a de novo childcare deal is not the construction budget. It is the trough underneath it.
Before any of the analysis, a childcare feasibility study has to declare which business it is describing, because the sector's published statistics describe a business almost no lender finances.
IBISWorld places the US day care industry at $74,036.2 million of revenue in 2025 across 608,129 establishments, with employment of 1,566,071 and total wages of $38,901.8 million (1). Those figures divide into an average establishment with revenue of $121,744 and 2.6 employees. An operation with 2.6 employees and $122,000 of annual revenue is a home-based family daycare. It is a legitimate and important part of the childcare supply, and it dominates the establishment count.
It is not the subject of an SBA credit. PeerSense, working the SBA loan-level file, reports 29,200 SBA loans to the day care industry code with an average loan size of $529,000 and $15.5 billion of cumulative volume (2). A $529,000 average loan implies a licensed centre with a real building, a commercial kitchen, a fenced playground, and a payroll running to twenty or thirty people. The distance between that facility and the $122,000 industry average is the entire analytical problem.
The practical consequence is that industry-average benchmarks are unusable for this asset class without a scale adjustment, and the study has to say so explicitly rather than quietly importing them. Where the underlying reports carry financial ratios broken out by asset-size band, the band closest to a financed single-site centre is the one to use. In the $1 million to $5 million total-asset band, rent runs 5.2 percent of revenue, salaries and wages 16.6 percent, compensation of officers 5.5 percent, depreciation 4.6 percent, advertising 1.5 percent, and interest paid 1.2 percent (1). In the $500,000 to $1 million band, the same lines read 7.8, 22.4, 7.7, 5.2, 1.4 and 2.7 percent. Rent falls and interest falls as facilities scale, which is the sensible direction, and it tells a lender something useful about where a specific deal sits relative to its real peer group.
| Expense line, share of revenue | $1 million to $5 million asset band | $500,000 to $1 million asset band |
|---|---|---|
| Rent | 5.2% | 7.8% |
| Salaries and wages | 16.6% | 22.4% |
| Compensation of officers | 5.5% | 7.7% |
| Depreciation | 4.6% | 5.2% |
| Advertising | 1.5% | 1.4% |
| Interest paid | 1.2% | 2.7% |
One caution about those bands. Reported net income spikes to 17.5 percent in the $1 million to $5 million band against 7.0 percent below it and 6.1 percent above it (1). That figure sits after officer compensation and it is not owner discretionary earnings. Treat it as an artifact of the band's tax-return composition, not as a margin a projection can adopt.
Licensed capacity is not one number. It is the outcome of three constraints applied room by room, and the binding one is whichever bites first.
The first is the staff-to-child ratio by age band. Infant ratios cluster at one adult per four children in Texas, Florida, California, New York and Pennsylvania. They tighten to one per three in Massachusetts and Maryland, and loosen to one per five in North Carolina (6). Ratios relax as children age, commonly to one per six for toddlers and one per ten to one per fifteen for preschool. The infant room is therefore the most expensive square footage in the building on a per-child basis and the least forgiving on staffing, which is why centres in tight-ratio states often run infant capacity as a loss leader that feeds the profitable preschool rooms three years later. A projection that treats all age bands as economically equivalent has not modelled the business.
The second is maximum group size. Several large states, including California, Florida and Texas, set no statewide group-size cap, which means capacity in those states is staffing-driven. Others cap group size explicitly, and in those jurisdictions a room can be ratio-compliant and still non-compliant on headcount. The study has to check both.
The third is usable square footage. This is the most uniform requirement in American childcare regulation. The modal standard nationally is 35 usable square feet of indoor space per child and 75 square feet of outdoor space per child, traceable to the Caring for Our Children national health and safety standard and echoed in most state administrative codes (5). Usable is the operative word. It excludes kitchens, bathrooms, hallways, offices and storage, which is why a 10,000 square foot building does not license for 285 children.
Those three constraints together determine the licence, and the licence determines the revenue ceiling. Any competent study builds the capacity table room by room, states the governing state code section, and shows which constraint binds in each room. Because ratio and group-size rules are amended by states on their own schedules, every figure of this kind needs verification against the current administrative code at the time of the study rather than against a secondary compilation.
Having built the licensed capacity table, the study then has to explain why the centre will never fill it.
Four mechanisms account for most of the gap. The first is age-mix mismatch: a centre licensed for a fixed number of infants, toddlers and preschoolers in a fixed room configuration faces a local population whose age distribution does not match, so one room runs full and another runs light. The second is turnover, which in childcare is continuous rather than episodic, as children age out of the top band and into school every year. The third is part-time enrolment, where two three-day children occupy one slot's worth of space but produce less than two full tuitions. The fourth is staffing: a room cannot open without a qualified lead teacher, and in a market where the median childcare worker earns $15.41 per hour (15), the constraint is often the hiring pipeline rather than the demand.
The result is the 80 to 90 percent stabilised band described at the outset. A study should show the licensed number, the stabilised enrolment assumption, the percentage relationship between them, and the reasoning for the specific percentage chosen in this market. A reviewer's first test is whether that reasoning exists at all.
The ramp is where childcare credit risk actually lives, and it behaves differently from the lease-up curve a lender knows from other asset classes.
Published guidance converges on 12 to 24 months from opening to break-even and stable profitability (10), with brand-side and advisory guidance extending to 18 to 36 months for mature occupancy (11). That range is wide because it depends on the enrolment campaign, the local waitlist depth, and the staffing market, but the shape is consistent: slow initial fill, accelerating through the first full academic cycle, stabilising in the second or third year.
What makes the curve punishing is the labour floor beneath it. Ratios are a legal requirement from the moment a room holds one child. A classroom licensed for twelve toddlers at one adult per six needs two adults on the floor whether it holds twelve children or four. The centre therefore incurs close to full classroom labour cost at low occupancy and cannot flex it down without closing the room. Layer on the director, the assistant director, the cook, and the administrative staff, all of whom are needed from day one, and the operating cost curve is nearly flat while the revenue curve climbs from zero.
Personnel accounts for 70 to 80 percent of program cost in childcare (4), the highest share of any asset class an SBA lender routinely finances. That concentration is what converts a slow ramp into a solvency event rather than a disappointing quarter.
The correct funding question in a de novo childcare deal is not what the building costs. It is how deep the hole goes before it fills.
Financial Models Lab frames this as the monthly cash trough, the lowest cash balance reached before break-even, and argues it is the figure a lender should size the interest reserve and working capital cushion against (12). That framing is right, and it is the single most useful thing a feasibility study can hand a credit officer on this asset class. Cushion guidance runs 3 to 6 months of operating expenses at the lower end (12) to 6 to 12 months at the more conservative end (13).
A worked illustration makes the shape concrete. Take a centre licensed for 120 children across eight rooms, opening with three rooms staffed. Ratios require the full teaching complement in those three rooms from the first day, and the director, assistant director, cook and administrator are needed regardless of how many rooms are open, so roughly half of the eventual payroll is committed against roughly a quarter of the eventual tuition. As the remaining rooms open across the following eighteen months, each repeats the pattern on a smaller scale: a step up in fixed labour, then a gradual fill behind it. The aggregate cash curve falls through the first two or three quarters, flattens as the earliest rooms reach stabilised enrolment, and only turns once enough rooms have crossed their individual break-even points to carry the rooms still filling. The trough is the depth of that fall. It is a function of how many rooms open at once and how quickly each one fills, and neither variable appears anywhere in a construction budget.
A study that does this properly produces a month-by-month cash projection for the first 24 to 36 months, showing enrolment by age band, staffing by room against ratio, the resulting payroll, fixed operating costs, debt service, and the running cash balance. The trough is then a number rather than an adjective, and the interest reserve can be sized to it with a stated margin. Enrolment campaigns typically begin 60 to 90 days before opening, often with a soft opening, and the projection should reflect the pre-opening marketing spend and any pre-enrolment deposits in the months before revenue starts.
One methodological warning. Operators frequently present a waitlist as evidence of demand, and it is a signal, but conversion from stated interest to enrolled and paying child is not documented in any published source. Treat a waitlist as soft evidence supporting a ramp assumption, never as committed revenue, and never let it shorten the modelled ramp without independent corroboration.
Childcare tuition has risen faster than general inflation and is now bounded less by what a centre needs than by what a household can bear.
Child Care Aware of America puts the national blended average annual price at $11,582 in 2023, $13,128 in 2024, and $13,184 in 2025, with centre-based infant care at approximately $14,760 per year and a state spread running from roughly $5,436 in Mississippi to $24,243 in the District of Columbia (14). Between 2020 and 2024 the price of care rose 29 percent against 22 percent for overall consumer prices (14).
Two implications follow for a projection. First, tuition is a local variable, not a national one, and a study that applies a national average to a specific county is worthless. Second, the affordability ceiling is real and binding. In markets where household income has not tracked the 29 percent increase, further rate growth converts into enrolment attrition rather than revenue, and a projection that escalates tuition at 4 or 5 percent annually for five years needs to demonstrate that the local income distribution can absorb it. Revenue per slot, computed as tuition by age band times the stabilised utilisation assumption, is the metric that carries this analysis, and it should be shown by band rather than blended.
At the industry level, the childcare cost structure in 2025 reads: wages 52.5 percent of revenue, purchases 2.8 percent, rent 7.0 percent, marketing 0.4 percent, depreciation 1.9 percent, utilities 1.2 percent, and profit 15.0 percent (1). The profit line there is earnings before interest and tax, not owner net income, and should not be compared with an owner's tax-return figure without adjustment.
Two features of that structure deserve a lender's attention.
The wage share of 52.5 percent is extraordinary. For comparison, it is higher than any of the physician, dental, or restaurant industries an SBA lender commonly underwrites. Combined with the HHS finding that personnel is 70 to 80 percent of program cost (4), it means that essentially every operating decision in a childcare centre is a labour decision, and that wage inflation passes almost immediately into either tuition or margin. Given the affordability ceiling described above, it usually passes into margin.
The purchases line of 2.8 percent is the mirror image. There is almost no cost of goods in this business. Food, supplies, and curriculum materials are trivial next to payroll. That has one useful underwriting consequence: childcare margins are largely immune to the commodity and tariff pressures that move restaurant and manufacturing projections, and a sensitivity analysis should not waste a scenario on input costs. It should spend both scenarios on wages and enrolment.
Occupancy at 7.0 percent of revenue at industry level, falling to 5.2 percent in the $1 million to $5 million asset band (1), gives a usable threshold. A deal where projected rent or the equivalent ownership cost runs materially above the high single digits as a share of stabilised revenue is carrying a real estate basis the operating business cannot support, and that is visible before any other analysis is done.
The defensible framework for childcare demand is the child care desert analysis, and its threshold is specific. The Center for American Progress defines a desert as an area with more than three children under age 6 per licensed slot, equivalently 0.333 slots per child, a threshold originating in its 2017 mapping work (17). The 2026 update finds 46 percent of children under age 6 living in deserts, rising to approximately 70 percent in remote rural areas (17).
Two features of that methodology should carry into a feasibility study. First, CAP's current analysis uses an enhanced two-stage floating catchment built on a 20-minute drive time (17), which is the correct reason to prefer drive-time isochrones over radius rings in this asset class. Parents route childcare through a commute, not a compass. A three-mile ring across a river or an interstate describes a market that does not exist. Second, CAP itself flags that the licensed-slot denominator overstates real availability (9), which means a desert ratio computed from a state licensing database understates the shortage rather than overstating it. That asymmetry is useful, because it makes the desert finding conservative.
The demand qualifier that actually matters is labour force participation among mothers, because a household with a parent at home does not buy full-time care. BLS reports 68.0 percent participation for mothers with children under 6 and 73.9 percent for all mothers in 2025 (18). And here a current study has an obligation the older literature does not impose: research from the University of Kansas CareBoard project finds that participation among mothers of children under 5 fell 2.8 percentage points between January and June 2025, the steepest such decline in more than 40 years of data (19). That is a demand-softening signal in the exact cohort a childcare centre serves. A study that presents childcare demand as structurally undersupplied and stops there, without engaging that figure, is not describing 2026.
Supply counting is the last piece, and it is done from the state licensing database, facility by facility, with capacity by age band where the state publishes it. The practical limits are that databases lag closures, list capacity rather than enrolment, and do not distinguish a full centre from an empty one. Field verification of the nearest competitors, by telephone, is worth more than another decimal place on the ratio.
Ground-up construction of a childcare centre runs $200 to $550 per square foot on one contractor estimate and $150 to $450 on another, producing total project costs of $1.5 million to $5 million or more for a 7,500 to 12,000 square foot facility (20)(21). Conversion of existing retail or office space runs $400,000 to $600,000 and saves 20 to 30 percent against new build, but is frequently defeated by code and zoning obstacles that do not appear until plan review (22).
The cost items that make this asset class more expensive than a generic commercial interior are specific and worth naming in a cost build-up: the playground and its fall-attenuating surface, perimeter fencing, fire suppression and egress to the standard applied to occupancies with young children, ADA compliance, infant-room sink and diaper-changing placement, and durable child-safe finishes throughout. A cost estimate that reads like a general office fit-out has missed most of them.
On the SBA side, several rules interact.
Childcare is not named in the illustrative special-purpose property list in SOP 50 10 8, effective 1 June 2025 (28). But that list is expressly non-exhaustive and permits SBA to designate other properties, and a purpose-built centre has specialised classrooms, fenced play areas, child-scaled plumbing, a commercial kitchen, and code-driven fire and egress that together limit its convertibility to another use. Classification is therefore lender and appraiser determined, case by case. That determination is consequential: where the property is treated as special purpose, the 504 equity injection rises from 10 percent standard to 15 percent, and to 20 percent where the borrower is also a startup operating under two years, shrinking the SBA and CDC debenture piece from 40 percent to 35 or 30 percent (28). On a $4 million project that is $400,000 of additional equity, and it is decided by an appraiser's characterisation rather than by anything in the borrower's control. A feasibility study should flag the exposure early rather than let it surface at commitment.
There is no blanket feasibility study mandate. The governing regulation is permissive (29), and SOP 50 10 8 leaves the decision to lender judgment. In practice a study is expected for startups, ground-up construction, changes of ownership, and special-purpose property, which describes the typical childcare transaction almost exactly.
Owner-occupancy requirements are 51 percent of an existing building and 60 percent immediately for new construction, rising to 80 percent within ten years (28). For a purpose-built centre this is rarely a constraint, since the operating business occupies essentially the whole building, but it matters where a developer intends to lease surplus space.
Where the transaction is an acquisition, an intangible portion above $250,000, or any related-party transaction, requires an independent business valuation from a Qualified Source (28).
Licensing is the condition precedent that has no analogue in most asset classes. A new centre generates no revenue until the state licence issues, and the licence typically requires a completed, inspected facility. That sequences the deal: construction completion, inspection, licence, enrolment, revenue. Disbursement, interest reserve, and working capital all have to be structured around that chain, and a projection that starts revenue in the month of construction completion has skipped a step that can take months.
Finally, SBA is not the only route. USDA Community Facilities and Business and Industry programs serve rural childcare, and several states run dedicated facility programs, including Washington's Early Learning Facilities program, which has awarded more than $180 million since 2017 (30). A study for a rural project that does not test the USDA alternative has left value on the table.
The major childcare franchises require capital on a scale that surprises borrowers who have priced an independent centre. Item 7 initial investment ranges in the 2025 disclosure documents run $704,000 to $8,568,000 for The Goddard School, $742,900 to $8,595,000 for Primrose Schools with an $80,000 franchise fee, and $902,500 to $8,568,000 for The Learning Experience (23)(24)(25). The upper ends of those ranges reflect fee-simple development including land.
What the borrower gets in exchange shows up in the Item 19 disclosure and, more interestingly, in the loan tape. Goddard discloses average EBITDA of $521,987 on average unit volume of $2.27 million for mature schools, a margin of approximately 23 percent (23), well above the industry profit line. And PeerSense's brand-level SBA data shows Goddard at 687 loans with a 1.2 percent default rate and Primrose at 554 loans with a 0.0 percent rate, against an all-industry benchmark of 15.8 percent measured as charge-offs divided by fully resolved loans (26)(3).
Those are striking numbers and they should be read carefully. They are brand-level counts from a commercial vendor, not a controlled comparison, and the independent childcare default rate is not disclosed at the industry-code level, so the franchise premium cannot be quantified against a matched independent cohort. What can be said is narrower and still useful: the two largest childcare franchise systems have SBA loan books that have performed far better than the SBA average, and a lender underwriting one of those brands is looking at a materially different historical record than a lender underwriting a first-time independent operator. Whether that is the brand, the operator selection, the site selection, or the capital requirement screening out undercapitalised borrowers is not determinable from the data.
For acquisitions rather than de novo development, BizBuySell's transaction data across 425 sold childcare listings shows an average multiple of 3.27 times seller discretionary earnings and 0.86 times revenue, with a median sale price of $395,000 on median revenue of $584,126 and median SDE of $132,779, and a median time on market of 214 days (27). By structure, single-site owner-operator centres clear 1.5 to 3.5 times SDE while professionally managed multi-unit operators reach 3 to 5 times EBITDA, with documented private-equity roll-up activity supporting the higher end (27).
The 214-day median time on market is the figure worth pausing on. It is long, and in a business whose value is heavily dependent on an intact staff and an enrolled roster, a long marketing period is itself a risk: directors leave, families move, and the roster the buyer underwrote is not always the roster the buyer receives. A feasibility study on an acquisition should verify current enrolment by age band against the trailing twelve months rather than accepting the seller's stabilised figure, and should test what happens to the projection if the director does not stay.
Three developments materially change a childcare projection written in 2026 relative to one written three years ago.
The federal relief funding has fully expired. ARPA childcare stabilisation funding of $24 billion lapsed on 30 September 2023 and the remaining $15 billion CCDF supplemental lapsed on 30 September 2024 (31). The Century Foundation's pre-cliff analysis forecast more than 70,000 programs at closure risk, affecting approximately 3.2 million children (31). That was a forecast rather than a measured outcome and should be cited as such, but the direction is not in dispute, and the practical consequence for a new entrant is a supply base that has been contracting in a demand environment that has not.
The employer-provided childcare credit has been substantially expanded. Internal Revenue Code section 45F now provides a credit of 40 percent of qualified expenditures capped at $500,000 generally, and 50 percent capped at $600,000 for eligible small businesses, on up to $1.2 million of expenditures, for amounts paid after 31 December 2025, against a prior structure of 25 percent capped at $150,000 (32). That is a four-fold increase in a provision that was previously too small to move corporate behaviour, and it turns employer-sponsored and employer-subsidised care into a live demand channel. A study in a market with a large single employer, a hospital system, or a manufacturing campus should test that channel explicitly rather than modelling only retail private-pay enrolment.
And the participation figure discussed earlier cuts the other way. The 2.8 point decline among mothers of children under 5 in the first half of 2025 (19) is the single most important counterweight in the current demand picture, and an honest study holds both facts at once: supply has contracted, and the demand qualifier has softened. The net effect is market-specific, which is the entire argument for doing the analysis locally rather than importing a national narrative.
| Test | What a deficient study does | What a financeable study shows |
|---|---|---|
| Capacity | Multiplies licensed capacity by tuition | Room-by-room capacity table, binding constraint identified, stabilised enrolment at 80 to 90 percent of licence with stated reasoning |
| Ramp | Assumes stabilisation in year one | Month-by-month enrolment and staffing projection over 24 to 36 months |
| Funding | Sizes the loan to construction cost | Identifies the cash trough and sizes the interest reserve and working capital to it with a margin |
| Labour | Applies a blended wage | Staffing plan by room against state ratio, at local wage data, with the fixed floor visible during ramp |
| Tuition | Applies a national average | Local rates by age band, tested against the local income distribution |
| Demand | Cites a national shortage | Drive-time catchment, licensed-slot supply from the state database, field-verified competitors, maternal participation |
| Licensing | Starts revenue at construction completion | Sequences inspection and licence issuance ahead of first enrolment |
| Special purpose | Assumes 10 percent equity | Flags the classification risk and its 15 or 20 percent consequence |
Not as a blanket rule. The governing regulation is permissive and SOP 50 10 8 leaves the decision to lender judgment. In practice a study is expected where the borrower is a startup, the project is ground-up construction, the transaction is a change of ownership, or the property may be classified as special purpose. Most childcare transactions meet at least one of those conditions, and de novo development usually meets three.
Because the licence assumes conditions that do not co-occur. Age mix in the local population rarely matches the room configuration, children age out continuously, part-time enrolment consumes slots without producing full tuition, and a room cannot open without a qualified lead teacher. Operator benchmarks put healthy occupancy at 85 to 95 percent of capacity with a viability floor near 70 percent of licence, and 80 to 90 percent of licence is the defensible stabilised assumption.
Published guidance converges on 12 to 24 months to break-even and stable profitability, with brand-side and advisory guidance extending to 18 to 36 months for mature occupancy. The variance depends on the pre-opening enrolment campaign, local waitlist depth, and the staffing market.
The cash trough is the lowest cash balance the business reaches before break-even. It matters because childcare has a fixed labour floor: ratios must be staffed from the day a room opens, so the centre carries near-full classroom payroll at low occupancy. The operating cost curve is nearly flat while revenue climbs from zero, and the depth of the resulting hole, not the cost of the building, determines how much working capital and interest reserve the deal needs.
It is not named in the illustrative list in SOP 50 10 8, but that list is non-exhaustive and SBA may designate other properties. A purpose-built centre has specialised classrooms, fenced play areas, child-scaled plumbing, a commercial kitchen, and code-driven fire and egress that limit conversion, so the classification is made case by case by the lender and appraiser. Where it applies, the 504 equity injection rises from 10 percent to 15 percent, or to 20 percent if the borrower is also a startup under two years old.
Contractor estimates run $200 to $550 per square foot on one basis and $150 to $450 on another, producing total project costs of $1.5 million to $5 million or more for a 7,500 to 12,000 square foot facility. Converting existing retail or office space runs $400,000 to $600,000 and saves 20 to 30 percent, where code and zoning permit it.
Transaction data across 425 sold listings shows an average of 3.27 times seller discretionary earnings and 0.86 times revenue, with a median sale price of $395,000 on median revenue of $584,126 and median SDE of $132,779. Single-site owner-operator centres clear 1.5 to 3.5 times SDE, while professionally managed multi-unit operators reach 3 to 5 times EBITDA.
Yes, in both directions. The $24 billion stabilisation fund lapsed in September 2023 and the $15 billion CCDF supplemental in September 2024, and the pre-cliff forecast put more than 70,000 programs at closure risk. That has tightened supply for a new entrant. Working the other way, the section 45F employer childcare credit expanded from 25 percent capped at $150,000 to 40 percent capped at $500,000, or 50 percent capped at $600,000 for eligible small businesses, for amounts paid after 31 December 2025, which opens an employer-sponsored demand channel that was previously too small to matter.
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